**Benjamin Libet (1916–2007)** was an American neuroscientist best known for pioneering experimental studies on human consciousness, volition and the timing of neural activity relative to conscious experience. He worked for most of his career at the University of California, San Francisco, where he investigated neural processes underlying sensation, action and subjective experience.  **Major Contributions and Findings:** - **Timing of Conscious Will:** Libet’s most influential work involved experiments in which subjects made simple voluntary movements (e.g. a finger flex) while their brain activity was recorded via EEG and they reported the moment they became aware of deciding to move. These experiments revealed that a specific brain signal known as the _readiness potential_—a slow build‑up of electrical activity—began several hundred milliseconds **before** participants reported conscious awareness of their intention to act. This suggested that unconscious neural processes precede the conscious experience of deciding to initiate movement.  - **Implications for [[Free Will]]:** These results challenged traditional notions of free will by implying that the brain initiates actions before conscious intentions. However, Libet himself did not assert that free will is entirely illusory. Instead, he proposed that while unconscious processes may start actions, consciousness still has a window—a few tenths of a second—to _veto_ or inhibit those actions, an idea he called **“free won’t.”**  - **Conscious Mental Field Theory:** In later work, Libet developed a theory to account for how the unity of subjective experience arises from neural events. He suggested that consciousness may emerge from an integrated field created by brain activity, attempting to explain how localised neuronal events cohere into unified subjective experience.  **Legacy and Impact:** Libet’s experiments have been among the most discussed and controversial in cognitive neuroscience and philosophy. They prompted extensive debate about the nature of volition, the neural basis of conscious intention, and whether consciousness initiates or merely observes actions initiated by the brain. His work intersects empirical neuroscience with foundational questions about mind, agency and free will. `Concepts:` `Knowledge Base:`