George Kennan once warned that if a state spends a great deal of time preparing for war, it materially increases the likelihood that war will occur. His insight was not merely about military logistics; it was about psychology, institutions, and self-fulfilling prophecy. When planning, rhetoric, and budgets are oriented toward conflict, the imagination of policymakers narrows. Rivals are viewed less as competitors within a shared order and more as inevitable adversaries. Strategy becomes destiny. This observation sits uneasily alongside the continued existence of the [[Westphalian]] order — the state-based system that has structured international politics since the seventeenth century. Its core logic, later echoed in the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence — mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence — rests on restraint. The system assumes that stability depends not on ideological convergence but on reciprocal limits. Yet from another vantage point, particularly in parts of the Global South, the United States is seen not as a guardian of that order but as a power willing to bend or override it. Critics argue that Washington has, at times, subordinated sovereignty to intervention, sanctions, regime change, and alliance expansion. The irony is sharp: the very international order that emerged from five centuries of Euro-Atlantic ascendancy — an order some American officials still celebrate — appears, in their eyes, to be eroded by its principal architect. This tension is not only external but internal to the American tradition. There is a deep contradiction between the libertarian impulse of Thomas Jefferson and many of the Founding generation — the conviction that government is best which governs least — and the practical requirements of managing an empire. The genius of the Constitution lies in its suspicion of concentrated power, its checks and balances, and its commitment to limited government. Empire, by contrast, demands standing forces, global commitments, executive discretion, secrecy, and the projection of authority far beyond the consent of the governed. To prepare constantly for global confrontation while professing devotion to limited government creates structural strain. A republic oriented toward restraint must justify expansive military alliances, forward deployments, and interventionist doctrines. In doing so, it risks both validating Kennan’s warning — that preparation breeds the very conflicts it anticipates — and undermining the Westphalian norms it claims to defend. The central question, then, is whether a constitutional republic built on distrust of centralised authority can indefinitely sustain an imperial posture without transforming itself. If war planning becomes permanent, and sovereignty becomes conditional, the republic may find that in defending order, it has quietly redefined it — and, in the process, reshaped its own constitutional character. `Concepts:` `Knowledge Base:`